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Melnicoff: Amendment of Attachment Affidavits and Orders
BENCH AND BAR
AMENDMENT OF ATTACHMENT AFFIDAVITS AND
ORDERS
An admonishing forefinger - warning that attachment is a
harsh and arbitrary remedy, derogatory of the common law, to be
strictly construed; and a helping hand - permitting liberal amendment, has been the West Virginia approach in cases raising questions of formal errors in attachment proceedings. By decision and
by statute, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the
Legislature have together plotted a course which had its beginning in the second decision of the court's first term, held in January, 1864, and its ending almost three-quarters of a century later
with the enactment of the present statute.
The first case to raise the question of a formal defect in an
attachment proceeding was Pendleton v. Smith,' in which it was
contended that the attachment order was void because it was signed
" 'S. G. Naylor, Dep't Clerk,' and not .... Joseph R. Naylor,
Clerk, or Jos. R. Naylor, by S. G. Naylor, Dep'y Clerk." '2
The court, Judge Brown dissenting, held that the attachment
was totally defective for want of the name of the clerk of the court,
signed by himself or for him by his deputy:
"Writs, summons' and other process, which are required
to be issued by the clerk of a court, must be attested by the
clerk in his own proper name: or it may be done by his deputy
placing the name of his principal to the process: that the attestation of writs required by the constitution, means the subscribing the name of the clerk to the process. . . 8
Judge Brown, in his dissent, wrote the first of a series of
opinions which sub silentio eventually overruled the majority in
this case. The subscription to the attachment order was valid, he
declared, since
"The writ was issued by the deputy clerk, who was authorized by law to issue it; and was signed by him in his official
character as deputy clerk." 4
This strict construction placed on attachment proceedings and
1 1 W. Va. 16 (1864).
(1921) 10 A. L. R. 1495.
2 I. at 19.
a
at 24.
4 Ibid.

For a general discussion of this problem, see Note
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the rigid adherence to technicality was not lost on the bar, and six
years later the court had before it the ". . . question... as to the
validity of an attachment based on an affidavit without a jurat,
signed by the officer who administered the oath.' '
Judge Brown, speaking for the court, used this opportunity to
cut into the strict doctrine laid down in the Pendleton case and
to develop further the views set forth in his dissent there. The
error was one of "inadvertence or oversight," he said, an "accidental omission" which was corrected by evidence showing that the
affidavit had in fact been properly prepared and attested.
With Pendleton v. Smith. and Bank v. Gettinger contending as
authority, the entire question was again raised in Anderson v.
Kanawha Coal Company.6 Recognizing the uncertainty which
confronted the bar, as evidenced by the painstaking and careful
exceptions and assignments of error, the court again attempted to
settle the matter.
The first assignment of error, complaining of the permission
accorded the clerk to amend his certificate to the attachment
affidavit to show its true date, was dismissed, this being "a mere
clerical errror" the correction of which lay within the court's inherent power to allow amendment.7 The second assigmuent of
error, complaining of the permission accorded the clerk to endorse
his approval of the attachment bond subsequent to issuance but before trial, was held groundless since "no possible prejudice to the
defendant could have resulted from the court's permitting these
facts to be endorsed. "s
The argument, based on Pendleton v. Smith, that the certificates of the affidavit and of the acknowledgment and approval of
the attachment bond were insufficient in that they were signed
" 'Win. M. Kline, deputy for W. E. G. Gillison, clerk of said circuit court of Kanawha county,' "' a subscription in precisely the
same form as that to the attachment order which was declared void
in Pendleton v. Smith, likewise met with disapproval.
"That case," said Judge Green, "decides that writs or process
must be signed by or in the name of the clerk . . ." which distinguished it from the case at bar, he inferred, reasoning that the
GFarmer's Bank of Virginia v. Gettinger, 4 W. Va. 305, 309 (1870).
a 12W . Va. 526 (1878).
7 Id. at 534.
8 d. at 535.

SId. at 528.
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law did not require such formal certificates of the attachment
affidavit and approval of the attachment bond, and that even if
the law could be so construed, the questioned signature was merely
a "clerical error" which the court could permit to be amended "at
any time" on motion. 1 It is significant that no motion to amend
this subscription was made, although two such motions were made
with reference to other defects, the granting of which was unsuccessfully assigned as error.
The bar, however, continued to cite Pendleton v. Smith. Just
one year later it was again before Judge Green in the case of Ambler
v. Leach, where this question was raised:
"Was the judgment of the circuit court.., null and void,
because the summons . . . was blank as to its date. .. and because it was not signed by the clerk or his deputy?""'i
In deciding that it was not, the court curiously enough
acknowledged that Pendleton v. Smith had been correctly decided,
but attempted to end its authority as a precedent by declaring that
it was decided in accordance with a Virginia constitutional provision which required expressly that writs should be "attested by
the clerks of the several courts," a provision which was no longer
present in the constitution of West Virginia. Thus, within one
year and at the hands of one judge, Pendleton v. Smith had first
been confined to its facts and then declared overruled by a constitutional amendment.
12
Nevertheless, a decade later in the case of Davis v. Living, it
was assigned as error that the court had refused to admit a deed in
evidence on the ground that "a deputy recorder has no authority to
make a deed for land sold for taxes." Again Pendleton v. Smith
was cited and again discredited, the court approving Judge Brown's
dissent as expressing the view it wished to take.
Meanwhile, in 1882, the legislature helped settle the problem
by providing for a supplemental affidavit of attachment. 13 By
judicial construction, however, it was confined to the allegation of
additional facts to support the grounds for attachment already
alleged in the original affidavit and could not be used to introduce
10 Id. at 529.
11 15 W. Va. 677, 681 (1879). Accord: Laidley's Adm'rs v. Bright's Adm'r,
17 W. Va. 779, 791 (1881).
12 32 W. Va. 174, 9 S. E. 84 (1889).
13W. Va. Acts 1882, e.106; W. VA. CODE (1887) c. 106, § 1, par. 8.
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new grounds of attachment. 14 In short, the supplemental affidavit
could not be used to cure errors of substance but left untouched the
court's inherent power to allow amendment of errors of form.
In light of these cases and this statute, it is patent that the
court, paying little heed to logical symmetry, was seeking to avoid
the strict construction rule of Pendleton v. Smith. A rereading of
the decisions at this point will disclose that without exception in
cases following Pendleton v. Smith the court was ruling on
questions of formal errors in and amendments to proceedings other
than attachment orders.
It remained for Judge Brannon to articulate this distinction
in the Zeigler cases, in which he characteristically set the decisions
in the order of reason. In Bohn v. Zeigler he pointed out that,
"In this case arises the question of the deficiency and the
amendableness of the affidavit for attachment, while in the
case of Miller v. Zeigler, (at this term) ...the question of the
same character related to the order of attachment..."Is
It was assigned as error in the Bohn case that the court below
had refused to permit an original and supplemental affidavit, taken
before a notary in Ohio, to be amended by supplying an omitted
authentication of the genuineness of the notary's signature. Overruling the court below, Judge Brannon clearly distinguished errors
of form and substance and held that the court should have permitted the amendment.
Turning to the second problem "the question of the deficiency
and amendableness" of the order of attachment, Judge Brannon
held that an attachment order was not void for want of the clerk's
signature, terming its omission "a mere technicality arising from
inadvertence of public officers" which "the court ought to have
Studying the construction and language
given leave to amend."'
of this opinion, it is obvious that Judge Brannon believed that he
was dealing with a question of first impression. Otherwise, it is
14 In Fayette Liquor Co. v. Jones, 75 W. Va. 119, 122, 83 S. E. 726 (1914),
the court said: "By the very language of the statute the new affidavit can
only be supplemental, not corrective. It can only contain new facts, discovered
subsequent to the filing of the original affidavit. The statute does not authorize
the patching up of the original; it only authorizes the supplementing of the
same by additional facts, not known when the former affidavit was made."
Is Bohn v. Zeigler, 44 W. Va. 402, 403, 29 S. E. 983 (1898). Accord: Burgunder v. Zeigler, 44 W. Va. 413, 29 S. E. 1034 (1898); State v. Hamrick,
74 W. Va. 145, 81 S.E. 703 (1914); Fisher, Sons & Co. v. Crowley, 57 W. Va.
312, 327, 50 S.E.422 (1905).
28 Miller v. Zeigler, 44 W. Va. 484, 486, 29 S.E. 981 (1898).
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submitted, it would seem that where an attachment order was void
when signed by the deputy clerk, a fortiori it would be void when
the clerk's signature was omitted entirely.
The force of this opinion is somewhat blunted by Judge Brannon's reliance on the fact that the clerk properly signed a memorandum summoning a garnishee, written on the same sheet as the
unsigned attachment order. "That is a recognition by the clerk
of the authenticity of the order of attachment.' 17 Thus, it may be
that by implication Judge Brannon held this a properly signed
order of attachment.
With the question of formal errors in attachment affidavits and
their amendment thus settled, it remained only for the legislature to
build on what the court had already begun. In the code revision
of 1931, provision for the supplemental affidavit was omitted and
there was enacted in its stead the present statute which permits the
original affidavit to be
" ...amended at any time before trial by the substitution of a new affidavit... containing allegations of facts existing at the time of making the former affidavit; and the new
affidavit shall stand in lieu of the old one for all purposes."' 8
It will be noted that this like the former statute -relates only
to the amendment of attachment affidavits and is silent as to the
amendment of attachment orders. It is believed, therefore, that
the latter question is still controlled by Martin v. Zeigler.
The changes made by the 1931 enactment are noteworthy. Of
particular importance is the provision which permits the amending
affidavit to state matters of fact "existing at the time of making
the former affidavit". This radically changed the former provision
which only permitted allegation of facts "which may have come to
his [affiant's] knowledge since the filing of the original affidavit."'1
Further, until the 1931 statute the old affidavit remained in the
case, whereas under the present provision, "the new affidavit shall
stand in lieu of the old one for all purposes."
The effect of these changes offers an interesting field of speculation. While the court has not yet been called upon to decide any
cases under the 1931 statute, the history of this litigation warrants
17

1d.

at 487.

IsW. VA. REv.CODE (1931) c.38, art. 7, § 6.

For a similar provision relat-

ing to attachment affidavits in justices' courts, see id. c. 50, art. 9, § 3.
19 W. VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 106, § 1.
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the conclusion that both formal and substantial errors in attachment affidavits may now be amended. This conclusion finds support both in the court's rulings on amendatory matter sought to be
introduced by supplemental affidavit under the old statute, and in
the powers of amendment judicially declared inherent in courts of
20
original jurisdiction.
BEN IVAN MELNICOPF.

Member of the bar of Monongalia County.

ANNOUNCEMENT
The annual meeting of the West Virginia Bar Association
will be held at White Sulphur Springs, on September 16, 17 and
18. The first meeting will be held on the afternoon of Thursday,
September 16, and there will be an evening session at which there
will be a prominent speaker. The meeting will conclude on Saturday, September 18, at noon.

FOR SALE: Law Library. James A. Bent, Elldns, West Virginia.
20 Following the introduction of the supplemental affidavit in 1882, the
court, while continuing to allow amendments to correct errors of form, still
insisted that correction of other errors await the enactment of an amendatory
statute. Crim v. Harmon, 38 W. Va. 596, 18 S. E. 753 (1894); Sonners v.
Allen, 44 W. Va. 120, 28 S. E. 787 (1896); Fayette Liquor Co. v. Jones, 75
W. Va. 119, 83 S. E. 726 (1914). It may be argued that the amended affidavit
now permitted by statute relates to amendments presenting new facts in support of a ground already alleged and does not allow the allegation of new
grounds of attachment. It is believed, however, that the legislative intent
was to permit comprehensive amendment, safeguarding the defendant against
surprise by reliance on the court's inherent power to grant a continuance
whenever substantial justice so requires. The defendant is further protected
by his right of recourse to the plaintiff's attachment bond. The plaintiff is
likewise protected against having his attachment quashed and the surety on
his bond held liable because of a misconception of the ground of attachment,
particularly when the grounds for attachment are frequently within the peculiar knowledge of the defendant.
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